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“Regional and bilateral trade areas are hubs of open regional-
ism. The task before us is how to expand our cooperation to
other areas to create interlocking linkages. This should foster
multiple linkages in such areas as finance, energy, environ-
ment, and peace and security in this part of the world.”
     - President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
he formation of free trade agreements (FTAs),
both regional and bilateral, has been a world-
wide trend in recent decades. New generation
FTAs have evolved, with elements encompass-
ing trade facilitation and liberalization and covering di-
verse agenda and other enhanced features of coopera-
tion. This growing phenomenon poses a special challenge
not only to the multilateral trading system but also to
each individual country’s trade agenda, especially with
respect to balancing domestic industries’ interest vis-à-
vis the opportunities of the growing integration of econo-
mies.
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In the face of growing regional integration and global com-
petition, the Philippines has, as early as the 1980s,
shifted its strategy from a protectionist regime to a rela-
tively open economy. In pursuit of regional cooperation,
it was a party to the establishment of the Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1989 and the creation
of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992. It was also
a signatory to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995,
committing to the principles of multilateralism.
The failure, however, of the two successive rounds in the
WTO as well as the rise of Asian bilateralism has prompted
the Philippines to jump into the “bandwagon” of FTAs.
Recently, the Philippines started engaging in formal FTA
negotiations, both bilaterally, with Japan for an economic
partnership agreement, and interregion-ally, for the es-
tablishment of ASEAN-China, ASEAN-Japan and ASEAN-
India FTAs. Other prospective FTAs involving the Philip-
pines include the US-ASEAN, ASEAN-Korea and the
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations
(aside from other bilateral engagements).
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These FTA initiatives basically have a two-fold domain:
(a) trade facilitation and liberalization, and (b) enhance-
ment of economic relations. These objectives manifest
the Philippines’ commitment to greater trade liberaliza-
tion in this era of globalization. At the same time, the
preferential FTAs are considered as complements rather
than threats to the multilateral system of the WTO.1
Hence, there is recognition that negotiations should keep
within the principle of WTO consistency.
Nonetheless, there is increasing consideration about be-
coming more focused and aggressive in pursuing bilat-
eral or regional arrangements. As such, engagement in
FTAs is becoming a significant trade policy tool for the
Philippines.
Defining the Philippines’ FTA strategy
From the Philippines’ previous initiatives and current
negotiations, two principles are apparent in the national
policy of the government in engaging into a free trade
agreement. One is internal or domestic in character, which
requires that any FTA entered into by the Philippines
should be beneficial to the country. At the very least, the
country’s foreign trade policy in engaging into FTAs should
be guided by the following underlying principles and ob-
jectives of reforms: (1) global competitiveness, (2) sus-
tainable growth, (3) efficiency in allocation of resources,
and (4) poverty alleviation. And two is global in perspec-
tive, which provides that these FTAs should be in accord
with our multilateral commitments and toward the achieve-
ment of the multilateral goals. Notwithstanding these
preconditions, however, there are no concrete strategies
or deliberate policies toward FTAs. The Philippines ap-
pears to be more of a passive negotiator or participant
in FTAs. This position is not necessarily disadvantageous
since there are potential risks in engaging in FTAs.2 In
the long run, however, not having a systematic frame-
work in FTA negotiations would result in what Jagdish
Bhagwati refers to as the “spaghetti bowl effect.”3
There is no template for an ideal FTA strategy. However,
a country should at least be able to have a clear objec-
tive with respect to the elements of an FTA, the scope
and institutional framework, the assurance that the FTA
is more than an FTA per se and is a mechanism toward
achieving a stronger purpose, and the criteria for choos-
ing a partner to the FTA. The country could also benefit
from the different models of FTAs entered into by the
prospective partners. And as previously mentioned, there
has to be an explicit adherence to and consistency with
the WTO thrusts.
Defining the elements of FTA
Entering into an FTA provides an avenue for the country
to overcome existing and emerging barriers to trade be-
yond what can be achieved within the multilateral frame-
work. It increases the country’s competitiveness, enabling
it to compete better in the global economy (Austria 2003).
And even if FTAs are very much about market access and
investment liberalization in general, they may serve as
instruments that can allow the country to look further in
terms of investment attraction, trade facilitation, institu-
tion-building, technology upgrading and industry competi-
________________
1 Foreign policy statement of President Gloria Macapagal-Ar-
royo.
2 The potential risks or costs of entering into FTAs are trade
diversion, resource diversion (where government resources diverted
away from multilateral negotiations) and political diversion (which
could deplete political capital in doing domestic reforms).
3 “Spaghetti bowl effect” may arise due to the differential tariff
rates for FTA member and nonmember countries. Thus, the “spa-
ghetti strands” may emanate out of many different and overlapping
directions, with consequent negative welfare effects (Bhagwati and
Panagariya 1996).
Entering into an FTA provides an avenue
for the country to overcome existing and
emerging barriers to trade beyond what can
be achieved within the multilateral
framework. It increases the country’s
competitiveness, enabling it to compete better
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tiveness. Industry-by-industry adjustment and competi-
tiveness strategies must thus be mapped out by the gov-
ernment with industry leaders in order to maximize the
potentials of the FTA and manage the challenges of inte-
gration of economies (Intal 2004).
Ideally, then, the FTA strategy should be seen as a comple-
mentary tool in the country’s development and competi-
tiveness strategies, with impact on the three pillars of
the FTA, namely, goods, services, and investments. As
such, the identification of what provisions can be negoti-
ated along these pillars, what may be committed and
unbound, and what conditionalities and special issues
need to be addressed, should be done within this overall
development framework.
Determining the scope
In the context of multilateralism, FTAs serve as excep-
tion to the most-favored nation (MFN) clause. Hence, the
need for substantial elimination of all trade barriers with
respect to goods and substantial sectoral coverage with
respect to services.4 These should serve as the mini-
mum for a preferential agreement.
With respect to goods, trade barriers have gone beyond
the tariff and quota restrictions. The salient issue now is
with respect to the use of sanitary and phytosanitary
(SPS) measures, i.e., whether they are merely regulatory
mechanisms or actually nontariff barriers to trade. As a
developing country, the Philippines has a difficulty in com-
plying with the strict requirements of a developed
country’s SPS measures. If the standards cannot be
negotiated, then the country should push for the provi-
sion on cooperation and support in capability-building for
compliance with such measures.
Another important task for the government, apart from
determining what the country wants, is the identification
specifically of its sensitive products. Prior to the start of
the negotiation, there must already be a classification of
what products are negotiable and nonnegotiable. This is
especially relevant if FTA partners are to adopt a nega-
tive listing approach. Otherwise, there might be a sce-
nario where a prospective partner will make reservations
on all products covered, thereby reaching a point where
all the products seem to be excluded or protected from
that country’s perspective.
Meanwhile, other possible issues that the government
needs to address would be in services liberalization. For
instance, should the FTA stick to the GATS or GATS plus
in services liberalization?
FTA plus provisions
Aside from the traditional FTA issues, attention should
also be given to the so-called enhancing features of new
age FTAs. This would generally include rules on invest-
ments, competition policy, government procurement,
transparency and trade facilitation measures. Aside from
the fact that they facilitate trade, these provisions would
also serve as institutional safety nets for each FTA part-
ner or member state. The objectives of the FTA would be
better achieved if in the case especially of a developing
country, provisions on cooperative undertakings, support
and assistance in the areas of technology transfer, hu-
man resource development, environment, small and
medium enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure develop-
ment are included.
Finally, institutional mechanisms such as trade remedies
and dispute settlement mechanisms should put empha-
sis on mutually agreed solutions and take into consider-
ation other existing mechanisms like that of the WTO
and other FTAs which may have proper concurrent juris-
diction. There must be certain criteria as to what forum
should apply in a particular dispute in order to prevent
________________
4 FTA conditionalities include: For trade in goods - 1) mem-
bers of an FTA are not permitted to raise trade barriers (both tariff
and nontariff) against nonmembers; 2) members of an FTA must
eliminate, rather than lower, substantially all trade barriers among
themselves; and 3) members must achieve free trade among mem-
bers by a certain date. For trade in services - 1) the FTA must have
substantial sectoral coverage in terms of the number of services sec-
tors and volumes of trade; 2) members of an FTA must eliminate
existing discriminatory measures and/or prohibit new or more dis-
criminatory provisions in these services sectors.September 2004 4
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cases of forum shopping where substantial rights or ob-
ligations of both the multilateral and preferential agree-
ments are affected.
Choosing an FTA partner
A country’s FTA policy should not only focus on what type
of preferential treatment to give regardless of another
partner state; it should also have an established set of
criteria in choosing an FTA partner. This is particularly
important in the case of engaging into bilateral agree-
ments. There is a current trend especially in East Asia
that developed countries like Japan and the U.S. engage
in bilateral initiatives with individual ASEAN members.
For the Philippines, engaging in bilateral agreements with
its largest trading partners could maximize the poten-
tials of its trading relationship. However, an important
but sometimes neglected query is whether it will also be
advantageous to enter into potential bilateral FTAs with
countries where the Philippines has negligible trade.
It would be useful to review the established set of crite-
ria in choosing an FTA partner of countries who have al-
ready engaged or negotiated in various FTAs. The United
States requires that a prospective partner must be a
member of the WTO and should have an existing Trade
and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with the
former. On the other hand, Japan’s criterion in choosing
an FTA partner is generally based on (a) economic crite-
ria, (b) geographic criteria, (c) political and diplomatic cri-
teria, (d) feasibility criteria, and (e) time-related criteria
(MOFA 2002).5
These criteria are important because the extent and
magnitude of the winners and losers on the FTA will de-
pend on the choice of a partner or partners. As a whole,
the welfare effect of the FTA is the paramount consider-
ation in choosing a partner. Thus, factors such as eco-
nomic preconditions, size of the partner, potentials for
bilateral trade expansion, and those beyond static gains
should be taken into consideration (Avila et al. 2003).6
Taking these factors into consideration, it can be argued
that the Philippines can derive maximum benefits from
bilateral agreements with its major trading partners, spe-
cifically the U.S. and Japan, because trade with them
account for a big chunk of the country’s exports and im-
ports. The U.S., for instance, accounted for almost 28
percent of Philippine exports (estimated at US$8.9 bil-
lion) and 16 percent of the latter’s imports (US$5.2 bil-
lion) in 2001. Japan, the second largest trading partner
of the Philippines after the United States, meanwhile,
accounted for 14 percent of Philippines exports and 19
percent of the latter’s imports also in the same year.
It can be argued that bilateral agreements could be ben-
eficial and strategic for the country at this point in time.
However, to manage the risks that could arise from hav-
ing FTAs, the number of these bilateral agreements should
be limited to those with greatest positive potential im-
pacts.
The growing Asian liberalization
and the potential East Asia FTA
There is currently an increasing trend in the East Asian
economic integration. One of the major factors in this
concentration of intraregional trade has been the remark-
able increase in international production sharing. Indeed,
________________
5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2002. Japan’s FTA strategy (Sum-
mary).
6 Other measures such as proximity, income convergence,
intrafirm trade and policy convergence have also been suggested by
Haggard.
A country’s FTA policy should not only focus
on what type of preferential treatment to give
regardless of another partner state; it should
also have an established set of criteria in
choosing an FTA partner. This is particularly
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East Asian regionalism appears to be characterized and
stimulated more by dynamic developments in markets
rather than by formal political institutions, such that the
convergence of East Asian markets is actually happen-
ing even before a formal integration phase (Krumm and
Kharas 2003). Nonetheless, a need for a formal FTA is
increasingly being felt owing to still fragmented markets
within the region characterized by a diversity of cultures,
economic and political structures.
Consequently, there is also a plethora of proposals for
both bilateral and regional arrangements in the region.
As such, it is not unlikely that an East Asia-wide FTA would
be achieved sooner or later. This is inevitable given the
growing sentiment that trade liberalization within the ambit
of the WTO and APEC has not been making substantial
progress. In addition, taken in light with China’s acces-
sion to the WTO, the successful European Community
(EC) integration and the impending Free Trade Agreement
of the Americas (FTAAs), there is likewise an increasing
call for the creation of a “strategic alliance” if only to
enable the Asian region to face the current global trading
movement.
In comparison to Europe, Asian regionalism is not well-
institutionalized since it operates by consensus in regional
organizations over almost all collective actions. The EC
experience, however, cannot be totally compared with that
of the Asian regionalism because the scope, depth and
character of regional integration processes vary across
both numerous dimensions and among world regions.
The Asian inclusive character is more of a network-style
integration (Katzenstein 1996).
What is evident is that the economic integration in the
East Asia region or the ASEAN plus three is underway.
Indeed, initiatives toward such integration have actually
been emerging for at least the last two decades as shown
in the examples below.
Early regionalism
The 1980s marked the growth of regional forces in world
politics, and Asia was no exception. Intra-Asian trade, a
frequently used measure of regional integration, has in-
creased greatly in the early 1980s7 (Bergsten and Noland
1993). Although the ASEAN Declaration of August 8, 1967
might have started the regional cooperation, it is believed
that one defining force in the increase in trade was the
Declaration of the ASEAN Concord in Bali on February
24, 1976. Since then, further regionalism trends like
APEC in 1989 and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in
1992 have emerged.
Mahathir’s proposal
The formation of the then infamous all-Asian “East Asian
Economic Caucus” (EAEC), a cooperation of Southeast
Asia and Northeast Asia, was first proposed by Malay-
sian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad in 1990. This
idea, however, did not take root after the United States
expressed strong opposition to it (Chalermpalanupap
2002).
Institutionalization of ASEAN+3
The first step in the evolution of the ASEAN+3 was the
round of visits of then Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro
Hasimoto to the ASEAN countries in 1997. Unexpectedly
for Japan, the ASEAN proposed a summit among the
ASEAN countries, Japan, China and South Korea (Yoshida
2004).
________________
7 It was also at this time when the regional political develop-
ments in Northeast and Southeast Asia were competing for Euro-
pean attention (Katzenstein 1996).
...East Asian regionalism appears to be
characterized and stimulated more by
dynamic developments in markets rather
than by formal political institutions, such
that the convergence of East Asian markets
is actually happening even before a formal
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Asian monetary crisis and the role of Japan
Japan’s participation in East Asian regionalism began
with the outbreak of the Asian monetary crisis in 1997.
Aside from the earmarked US$17.3 billion for the ASEAN
countries during an IMF-support conference in Tokyo, Ja-
pan also formulated and introduced the concept of an
Asian Monetary Fund.8 It was during this time that the
first ASEAN+3 Summit was held and the New Miyazaka
Initiative9 was decided. Along with the continued finan-
cial assistance from Japan has been the conduct of sub-
sequent ASEAN+3 fora (Yoshida 2004).
It should also be noted that on the fourth meeting of the
ASEAN+3, when a task force was looking at the possibil-
ity of an ASEAN free trade zone, ASEAN-China leaders
and Chinese Primier Zhu Rongji endorsed the establish-
ment of a free trade area between China and the ASEAN
economies within 10 years. Consequently, other coun-
tries have shown interest in entering into FTAs with the
ASEAN, with proposals coming from Japan, Korea and
the U.S. in its “Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative” (Pangestu
2003).
Japan’s accession to the ASEAN Concord
On July 2, 2004, Japan, with the consent of the South-
east Asia, acceded10 to the ASEAN Concord, including its
first and second protocol amendments. The ASEAN Con-
cord embodies the members’ commitment to deepening
and broadening its economic integration and linkages with
the world economy to realize an ASEAN economic com-
munity as well as to further build on the momentum al-
ready gained in the ASEAN+3 process. The goal was to
further draw synergies through broader and deeper eco-
nomic cooperation in various areas (ASEAN Concord II).
Framework for the East Asia FTA
The framework for the East Asia FTA finds its basis on
the “Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation” (Manila
1999) which declares that the future issues of concern
for ASEAN+3 would include economic; monetary and fi-
nancial; social and human development; scientific and
technological development; culture and information; de-
velopment cooperation; and political and security issues.
Several ministerial level meetings and two working groups
have been organized since then. In the ASEAN+3 Sum-
mit, short-term measures like the formation of an East
Asia Forum and an East Asia Business Council as well as
long-term measures like the formation of an East Asia
Free Trade Area and the evolution of the ASEAN+3 Sum-
mit to an East Asian Summit were introduced. The pro-
cess of the East Asian regionalism has been progressing
along two tracks, one on financial cooperation and an-
other on the formation of an Asian economic community
(Young 2004).
Regional in perspective
There is no question that economic liberalization through
FTA formation should go beyond mere liberalization and
facilitation of trade of individual countries. At the very
least, it should include areas of capability-building and
human resource development, infrastructure development
and even regional coordination of national policies.
Nevertheless, these initiatives should be geared towards
community cooperation. This is necessary because the
________________
8 This was frustrated by strong opposition from the U.S. as it
would be an “easy money” for Asian countries.
9 A US$30 billion capital financial support package named af-
ter Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazaka.
10 This was signed by the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Yoriko Kawaguchi.
There is no question that economic
liberalization through FTA formation should
go beyond mere liberalization and
facilitation of trade of individual countries.
At the very least, it should include areas of
capability-building and human resource
development, infrastructure development and
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rapid integration of the world has given birth to global
concerns that could only be effectively addressed through
stronger regional cooperation. This is particularly impor-
tant to East Asia where much of the liberalization ben-
efits would be achieved through a complementarity of
production and exports within the region. Hence, a gen-
eral framework within the East Asian region should even-
tually evolve.
ASEAN as the link
With the exception of the Philippines’ strategic need for
special bilateral agreement with some other countries,
the country should participate more as part of the ASEAN
in movements toward economic integration. This would
reduce some of the costs, biases and difficulties of a
bilateral FTA approach.
Many of the proposed FTAs in East Asia are of the so-
called “hub and spoke” pattern (Box 1). The concern here
is that the balance of advantages in “hub and spoke”
arrangements will tend to favor the hub because of its
stronger bargaining position and greater attractiveness
of its central location to investors. In this regard, the
possibility of having the ASEAN as the hub may be ex-
plored.
Beyond the achievement of FTA
East Asia FTA is actually viewed as a “trade for develop-
ment” strategy within the region. This should be seen
more as an opportunity to create “interlocking linkages”
which would not merely lead to the national interests of
each country but also promote the development of the
region itself. This FTA should also be seen as a means
rather than an end in the light of the multilateral agenda.
A call to leadership
Regional cooperation calls for a special type of leader-
ship. In the words of ASEAN Secretary-General Ong Keng
Yong, “the challenge is how ASEAN (or ASEAN+3 in this
case) can provide the leadership in managing regional
interdependence and its impact and in overcoming some
inherent contradictions between being competitive and
being part of a community.”11
Concluding note
There is enough motivation for the envisioned East Asia
Economic Community to push forward and challenges
are on the way. Whether or not this East Asia FTA will be
a trade bloc, the long-run agenda should be to minimize
the risks arising from FTA formation.
In sum, multilateralism should still be the ultimate goal.
Preferential agreements could be entered into, bilater-
ally where benefits can be maximized or specific con-
cerns addressed, and regionally to serve as catalysts for
development and mechanisms for a more orderly global
trade order. In these endeavors, consistency with the WTO
in the long run should always be kept in mind.      
________________
11 Opening Address at the ASEAN Leadership Forum, Kuala
Lumpur, 22 March 2004.
Box 1. Hub-and-spoke system
The recent proliferation of bilateral agreements has cre-
ated a number of “hub-and-spokes” type of trade rela-
tionship. Figure 1 illustrates the concept of a simple hub-
and-spokes arrangement: one economy becomes a “hub”
by establishing two different bilateral FTAs with a number
of other nations herein the two spokes (S1 and S2) while
those spokes retain their MFN barriers on each other’s
goods.
Figure 1. Basic hub and spokes structure:
a stylized model
Source: Das and Andriamananjara, 2004.
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